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Nassima Sahraoui
 
Introduction
"[A]nd the crystal yielded to his pressure and
expanded, ‘til the breast of the captive could move
and heave. [...] Then horror and despair took hold
of him: he gathered all his force, he dashed
violently […] against the crystal."
E.T.A. Hoffmann, The Golden Pot
"But this order […] must rather be of the purest
crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an
abstraction, but as something concrete, indeed, as
the most concrete."
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
1 In Convolute N of  The Arcades  Project Walter  Benjamin introduces the metaphor of  a
crystal to demonstrate how a specific understanding of historical events provides insights
into the dynamics of history. Here, the possibility to reveal a totality of historico-political
events is introduced by a precise analysis of the momentum, which leads to historical
knowledge. 
2 The following article1 deconstructs certain figures of Benjamin’s thoughts on history and
on epistemology – such as image, trace, crystal, standstill, the ‘Now’, and the ‘subject of
historical knowledge’ – and relates them to the political dimension of his “Critique of
Violence”  (1921),  and to  his  remarks  on  the  linguistic  structure  of  political  writing.
Thereby  it  centres  on  the  following  questions:  in  what  way  could  Benjamin’s
characterisation of the singular moment, as well as his analysis of temporality, provide
insights into historical dynamics? Furthermore, it aims at investigating if, and to what
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extent, historico-political action is related to a certain understanding of time and power:
can such action be seen as a crystallised emanation of the ‘Now’, of Jetztzeit?
3 Referring to Jacques Derrida’s interpretation of Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence”, I will
furthermore point out that the ‘Now’ must be understood as a condensation of force
within an unspecified area of  possible political  actions,  through which the latter are
initially realised and performed. Drawing on Derrida’s remarks, I attempt to show that
the  initiating  force  or  power2 results  from a  de-constitutive  act  rather  than  out  of
constitution  itself.  Both,  Derrida  and  Benjamin,  introduce  this  de-constitutive  act  in
referring to ‘silence’ as indispensable for any initial moment of historico-political action.
In  other  words,  the  initiating  linguistic  force  of  silence  is  inseparable  from  an
instantaneous moment of the ‘Now’, from which every possible action and event derive.
4 At the junction between the essential  claims of  both approaches,  I  will focus on the
temporal  moment where historical  events  take place –  the ‘Now’  –  and thus draw a
picture  of  how  the  realms  of  time  and  history  merge  together  with  a  certain
understanding of political language, as Benjamin suggests. I finally conclude by stating
that the specific relations between instantaneous historical events, political action, and
language must, in the last instance, be understood as the initiating force for political and
historical  events. The ‘Now’  is  thus,  metaphorically speaking,  a  crystallised historical
event, and this crystallised historical event – or force – already hints towards a certain
ethical direction,3 as Derrida finally indicates.
 
I. Trace, Subject, and Image
"In the trace, we gain possession of the things [...]
History decays into images, not into stories."
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project
5 In “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility” (1935-36), Walter
Benjamin defines the trace – against the philosophical tradition – not simply as a ‘place’
in  which  objects  (things)  are  re-presented  without  being  present.  Accordingly,
philosophy’s  theoretical  task  does  not  only  consist  in  dissolving  the  dialectical,
paradoxical, and aporetic relation between presence and absence.4 Instead, the trace is
related to, but different from, the concept that Benjamin has prominently elaborated: the
aura. The concept of aura suggests the possibility that things can be perceived as they are
in-themselves, that is to say, in their specific singularity. This being in-itself indicates the
authentic state of things in a certain instant of time and at a certain place; any other
essential  reality  remains  unattainable.  To  the  question:  “What, then,  is  the  aura?”
Benjamin therefore answers: “A strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of
a distance, however near it may be.”5
6 In The Arcades Project, Benjamin relates the trace immediately to the aura. Whilst the aura
shows  worldly  objects  in  their  “here  and  now”,6 and  hence  in  their  socio-historical
situatedness, the trace is analogously characterised through the objects’ non-presence.
Hereby the auratic presence of things is not simply reversed, which means, they are not
simply conceived as being absent. Rather, they are structured as being not-here and not-
now. Every analysis of what a trace actually is must therefore proceed ex negativo. Hence,
in the trace one can detect the objects in their non-presence, and in tracing these objects
they are made present. In The Arcades Project, Benjamin amplifies his definition of the aura
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from the ‘Artwork’ essay, when he formulates the relation between trace and aura as
follows:
Trace and aura. The trace is appearance of a nearness, however far removed the
thing that left behind may be. The aura is appearance of a distance, however close
the thing that calls it forth. In the trace, we gain possession of the things; in the
aura it takes possession of us.7
7 By definition, the trace always has a double and mutual reference to its exterior, and this
referentiality  is  located  between  the  present  and  the  presence/non-presence  of  the
objects. On the primary level, the trace refers to the problematic relation between reality
and temporality. While the traditional paradigm is dominated by the idea that in the
trace the objects are represented as a mere likeness (Abbild) of reality, where the ‘task’ of
deciphering traces then would simply be to track the right and reasonable signs in order
to recognise the true essence of the objects, Benjamin’s short remarks already indicate
that this is an insufficient description, which does not do justice to the complexity of the
phenomenon. Just as the aura is identical with the here and now of the objects, so the
trace concerns not only how something appears, but also as what it appears. That is to say,
the only reality of the thing in the trace therefore consists in the manifestation of that
which  it  is  not.  For  a  thing  to  be  present  in  the  trace  is  tantamount  to,  both,  its
simultaneous appearance and to its negation. What the object is in ‘truth’ can be shown
only by negating what it is not. But if the ‘truth’ of the things in truth consists in showing
their negative attributes, and if the trace furthermore is structurally interlinked with the
here and now, then the ‘truth’ of the things lies in their negativity. This negativity, then,
is  immediately  related  to  socio-historical  constellations  of  the  ‘here  and  now’.8 The
transformative dynamics  of  socio-historical  constellations  are  transformations  of  the
‘truth’ – therefore the ‘truth’ must always be understood within the referential horizon of
its respective epochs. In acknowledging this referential relation, any metaphysical notion
of unity and originality must be destroyed.9
8 Whilst in metaphysics, the objects have an inherent perpetuating truth – be it essential,
eternal,  absolute,  otherworldly  or  omnipresent  –  Benjamin’s  trace  absorbs  the  time-
instances of past, present and future into the here and now.10 The trace can therefore be
understood  as  the  relational,  intermediating  instance  within  this  trinomial  time-
structure.  Through  its  absorbing  and  intermediate  character,  the  trace  opens  the
possibility  to  recognise  the  ‘trueness’  of  things.  It  does  so  through  the  interfering
movement  between  presence  and  non-presence,  of  presensation  and  presentation  (
Vergegenwärtigung),  of  representation  and  presentation  (Darstellung).  This  movement
manifests itself as a permanent deferment in the interior of the trace, and the detection
of  the  trace  flows together  with an actualisation of  time.  Consequently,  the  trace  is
nothing but this contraction of nearness and distance. 
9 On a secondary level,  the trace is,  therefore,  the truth-establishing condition for the
‘subject’.  Because  the  trace  essentially  consists  in  this  aporetic  movement  between
presence and non-presence, the notion of truth – and with it each and every other
metaphysical  attempt  at  unification,  which  undoubtedly  contains  the  notion  of  the
‘subject’ itself – is structured though this immanent deferment. This means that these
allegedly unified classical concepts are themselves already and inherently determined by
this time-deferring movement. Tracing the future then finally means to bundle the past
ex tempore in tempore.
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10 Benjamin’s historico-philosophical fragments and excerpts in Convolute N of The Arcades
Project provide a key for understanding the specific possibilities of knowledge in traces.
Here,  he  begins  his  fragmentary  reflections  on  epistemology  and  on  the  theory  of
progress  with  the  following  words:  “In  the  fields  with  which  we  are  concerned,
knowledge comes in lightning flashes.”11 Knowledge, as Benjamin further explains, does
not emerge out of a continuous process of self-consciousness, but rather occurs in the
exact moment of awakening. What then, one must ask at this point, is happening in this
exact  moment of  awakening? Is  there even a ‘consciousness’  to be awakened? And is
Benjamin referring to something happening to the subject or is it rather the subject itself
who initiates the awakening through its own actions? What is the relationship between
the perceptive acts  of  self-consciousness and the initiation and practice of  historico-
political actions? For Benjamin, these questions are intimately linked with the conditions
of  historical  action.  The  experience  of  the  decay  of  the  social  order,  as  he  explains
following the conception of  historical  materialism, transforms the ways in which we
perceive the ruling social and political asymmetries. But in contrast to the conception of
historical materialism – which is the ‘tradition’ Benjamin sees himself in line with12 – this
perception  has  no  systematic  function.  The  perceptions  of  social  and  political
asymmetries are not de-ideologising movements, in the sense that they would lead to a
consciousness  of  continuous  historical  progress  in  which  the  immanent  dialectical
dynamics ultimately lead to a transformation of the social order.13 History, according to
Benjamin, is not characterised in terms of continuity and progress, which would strive for
completion or teleological process, but rather by unforeseeable events which suddenly, in
lightning  flashes,  erupt  into  the  present  structures.  The  “fields  with  which  we  are
concerned”14 can thus be identified as epistemology and history, and – as we will see later
– politics as well.
11 Additionally,  the  paradoxical  double  referentiality  in  the  trace  not  only  denotes  a
transformation  of  the  conditions  of  socio-political  and  historical  knowledge;  it  also
denotes a transformation – or, more precisely, a deferral – of the concept of the subject. If
the trace operates as an interfering instance between the subject and its surrounding
social, political, and thus historical reality, and if it is furthermore characterised by a
paradoxical double referentiality in-between its temporal and spatial interior/exterior,
then the notion of the ‘subject’ inevitably loses its unique position within the traditional
philosophical paradigm of a binary coded world, consisting of linearly, transcendentally,
or dialectically related subjects and objects. But what exactly does this deferral of the
concept of ‘subject’  mean for its constitution? In other words,  who is the “subject of
historical knowledge”15 that Benjamin refers to?
12 The following short speculative excursus16 takes its point of departure from a primarily
negative hypothesis: Benjamin does not provide a ‘concept’ of the subject in the classical
sense. Nor is he thinking the world merely through a dualistic schema of subjects and
objects, respectively. And yet his entire work can be read as an attempt towards a “theory
of the modern subject”,  as Gerhard Richter puts it.17 Throughout his work,  Benjamin
draws a multifaceted picture of the complex deferral of the concept of the ‘subject’ during
the 19th century, whose unique position was hitherto seen as a sacrosanct philosophical
fact,  at  least  since  Descartes’  cogito  ergo  sum.  At  the  same  time,  he  analyses  the
mobilization of  the  working  class  and although the  cornerstones  of  this  picture  are
multifarious they culminate in the antagonistic and dialectic struggle of the modern or
‘industrialized’ subject, which finds its theoretical pendant in historical materialism.18
A Crystal of Time
Anthropology & Materialism, Special Issue | I | 2017
4
13 As to the question ‘who is the subject of historical knowledge’, with Benjamin one would
have  to  reply:  “the  struggling  and  oppressed  class.”19 Although  this  assertion
undoubtedly  carries  the  initials  of  historical  materialism,  Benjamin  is  far  from  the
theoretical assumptions of vulgar Marxism with its simplifying Basis-Überbau-structure.
Instead of relying on a dual hierarchy between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, he
departs from the ‘system’s’ intrinsic components – that is, its complexities, ideologies,
hierarchies, and paradoxes – that together form the conditions of the capitalist dynamics.
In The Arcades Project, this finally leads him to the transitional historical period of the
Second Empire, and to the radical urban reorganization of its capital Paris, where these
intrinsic components are condensed in a paradigmatic form. The intrinsic components of
capitalism and the course of history, thus, are mutually dependent. Understood in terms
of Benjamin’s rethinking of historical materialism, the modern subject then is located at
the threshold of this immanent mutual dependency. It is exactly this threshold which
must be taken as a point of departure for any understanding of the modern subject, and
moreover, as a gateway for historiography itself. For it is only from the perspective of this
in-between – the intersecting point of the formerly juxtaposed in- and outside – that an
adequate description of the “changed ways of being-in-the-world [Daseinsweise]  of the
historical collectives” is possible, and, by extension, a changed perception of the world, as
Benjamin  puts  it  in  his  essay,  “The  Work  of  Art  in  the  Age  of  its  Technological
Reproducibility”.20
14 This deferral of perspective towards the system’s intrinsic components is neither coming
from the outside nor from beyond, in other words: it is neither a transcendental nor a
metaphysical approach to history and knowledge, nor is it a judgment that would give
preference to the oppressed or the oppressors. Instead, the task of the historian consists
precisely  in  collecting  and  assembling  these  components;  in  Benjamin’s  words,
historiography’s task is to “carry over the principle of montage into history.”21 Set in a
‘right’  constellation, this montage intensifies history’s dialectic dynamics,  rather than
exposing it, as will be shown below. 
15 Thus,  the  notion  of  the  ‘subject’  in  Benjamin  cannot  be  fully  grasped  in  either
metaphysical  or transcendental terms nor,  indeed, in terms of historical  materialism.
Accordingly, in one of his notes towards the theses “On the Concept of History” (1940),
Benjamin strongly rejects the notion of a transcendental subject:
This subject is by no means a transcendental subject but the struggling, oppressed
class in its most exposed situation. Historical knowledge exists only for them and
for them solely in a historical moment.22
16 Hence,  the subject  of  historical  knowledge is  nothing other than the oppressed class
itself. We can assume that Benjamin uses the concept of the subject here in a double
sense: it is the ‘subject’ as historico-political agent and the ‘subject’ as theme or topic of
historiography. But while the latter hinges on the historian’s “sharpened awareness for
the crisis  in which the subject  of  history has respectively stepped in”,23 as  Benjamin
remarks in his notes, the first is ultimately grounded in historical experience. In other
words, historical experience itself is the condition of the possibility of the subject’s (i.e.
the oppressed class’s) very existence. With this claim, Benjamin inverts the Kantian idea
that the transcendental subject is the condition of possibility of experience. To exist as a
subject at all, however, means to be legible as such, and this, in turn, is indispensably
entangled with the sudden moment of  historical  knowledge.  Benjamin’s  idiosyncratic
reading of historical materialism provides a thought-figure: the a-chronological and a-
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linear dialectical movement between history and its subject, experience and knowledge,
and finally  between historiography and the  historian.  Now,  the  dialectic  is  not  only
restricted to perceive this movement as a whole, as a unique movement of subordinated
components, but it is inherent in each of its components, and in each and every moment
of alteration or turn from one to the other. The subject with its experience now stands at
the threshold of this dialectic. In this Benjaminian metamorphosis of the concept of the
modern subject, the subject itself is not merely a singular unity anymore, but rather a
frame  filled  with  potential  experiences  of  the  intersecting  alterations  of  history’s
components, along with all the rifts and ruptures that the capitalist system produces. 
17 Remembering the aforementioned quote, “[i]n the field with which we are concerned,
knowledge comes in lightning flashes”,24 we can now say that these rifts and ruptures in
the present (industrialised, capitalistic) structures manifest themselves only through the
experience of a subject who is instantaneously affected by social and political dialectics.
Knowledge in this sense is empirical knowledge. It seems evident that the moment of
‘lightning’,  in  which knowledge is  concealed,  and the  historical  event  coincide  here.
However, this conclusion loses its simplicity if we recall Benjamin’s explications on the
correlation between the event, the historical process, and the subject.
18 The concept Benjamin repeatedly uses to define these moments of lightening, in which
subjective experience, action, and historical knowledge are inseparably entangled is that
of the image. The image is primarily defined by its inherent dialectical movement. The
dialectical  movement  always  takes  place  in  the  in-between  before  and  after  present
historical moments:
[E]very dialectically presented historical circumstance polarizes itself and becomes
a force field in which the confrontation between its fore-history and after-history is
played out. It becomes such a field insofar as the present instant interpenetrates it.
25
19 Within this  tension between past  and future,  the dialectical  moment creates its  own
possible interruptions, insofar as it overstretches the actual relation between subjective
perceptibility in the modes of experience and the conception of an objective historical
succession. But the dialectical movement neither departs from the past,  nor does the
historical process endeavour to attain a future programme. Rather, due to their mere
existence,  the actual moments themselves already challenge fore- and after-historical
processes;  hence  the  present  contains  the  dialectic  in  itself.  Referring  back  to  the
metaphor of the ‘flash’, we can conclude that there is no causal connection between what-
has-been and  what-is-now.  Moreover,  actuality  fundamentally  questions  its  own  time-
status  by  its  own  immanent  dialectical  movement.  In  doing  so,  it  negates  both  the
ideology of the “semblance of eternal sameness”26 and a teleological, idealistic concept of
history.  Hence,  the recognisability of events is immediately connected to their actual
manifestation – because in it, the present leaps forth into the past, it almost takes a leap
out of itself. As Benjamin famously writes in his fourteenth and fifteenth theses ‘on the
Concept of History’, “it is the tiger’s leap into the past”, which “make[s] the continuum of
history explode”.27 Since there is no continuity between the past and the present, and
since events only emerge in flashes, it is actuality itself that constitutes the dialectical
movement.  Moreover,  this movement is only possible because of the discontinuity of
history.  If  history  were  a  continuous  process,  then  there  would  be  no  present;
hyperbolically speaking, there would be neither history, nor historical knowledge:
[t]he dialectical image is an image that emerges suddenly, in a flash. What has been
is to be held fast – as an image flashing up in the now of its recognisability.28
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20 And, 
each “now” is the now of a particular recognisability. In it, truth is charged to the
bursting point with time.29
21 Historical knowledge therefore is possible only in those moments of lightning flashes, in
which the image – that is, the sudden emergence of an event – appears. And it is possible
only  through  the  mediation  of  a  ‘materialist’  perception,  namely  the  subjective
experience of dialectics. And this experience is the trace.
 
II. Silence, Standstill – Now
"The historian is the herald […]."
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project
"Silence is the perfectest herald of Joy."
William Shakespeare, Macbeth
22 The previous section should have made clear that there is no historical continuity and
that historical events are actualised in a sudden way. Furthermore, historical knowledge
is immediately related to the spontaneity of the present moment. As these moments are
related to history as such, on the one side, and to the experience of the subject, on the
other, they operate as an interfering instance between totality and singularity. Herein we
recognise the truth:
[n]evertheless,  truth is  not […] a merely contingent function of  knowing,  but is
bound to a nucleus of time lying hidden within the knower and the known alike.30
23 Benjamin limits  the  recognisability  of  historical  events  to  singular  ‘nuclei  of  time’  (
Zeitkerne),  because they depend on each image appearing in this singular moment.  In
opposition to a phenomenological approach to history – Benjamin is explicitly arguing
against Heidegger31 – he shows that events not only belong to a specific time, but that
they are only legible in a specific time. This legibility “constitutes a specific critical point
in  the  movement  of  their  interior.”32 Legibility therefore  means  interrupting  the
dialectical process of the event in itself. The only instant of time in which this interruptive
act is possible at all is the moment of the ‘Now’. At this point the fundamental question
arises: what exactly brings forth the legibility and, more importantly, the criticisability of
events? Considering my previous observations, it now seems to be clear that a systematic,
teleological model for the interpretation of historical events neither leads to historical
knowledge, nor to historical transformation. Instead, Benjamin illustrates that the image
must coincide,  or as he puts it,  must be ‘synchronic’  with the particular ‘Now’ of its
recognisability: “image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the
now to form a constellation.”33
24 So what finally is to be recognised in the ‘Now’ of recognisability is the disruption of the
historical process, the deconstruction of its very own dynamics. The image that flashes up
in the ‘Now’ does construct anything but, rather, destroys. What happens in the moment
of  this  particular  formation  is  actually  –  nothing.  Literally  this  means  that  the
recognisability of history is bundled in a particular point of time. Herein it seems as if it is
detached  from  its  surrounding,  as  if  the  dialectic  process  is  suspended.  Therefore
Benjamin writes: “[t]o thinking belongs the movement as well as the arrest of thoughts.
Where thinking comes to a standstill in a constellation saturated with tension – there the
dialectical  image  appears”;34 “image  is  dialectics  at  a  standstill.” 35 The  ‘ Now’ is
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immediately linked to the image, and the sudden emergence of the image implements a
standstill. But what exactly are the implications of this standstill, and what does happen in
this specific moment of the ‘Now’? If the dialectic movement has been interrupted – if it
has crystallized – this could suggest that the moment contains nothing. But history is not
nothing. Rather, the standstill absorbs what-has-been in one particular point of time. This
absorption creates an immense tension because it designates exactly the moment before a
new event,  before  something must happen.36 The dialectical  image and the  object  of
materialistic  historicism coincide within this  ‘force field’  (Kraftfeld).  This  is  why it  is
justified to ‘blast’ historical events out of the continual process of history in an act of
violence.
25 Force  and  violence:  both  concepts  refer  to  the  connection  between  Benjamin’s
epistemological and historico-philosophical statements on the one hand, and the sphere
of politics on the other. Not least,  they refer to the all-encompassing ethical-political
realm,  which is  most  obvious  in  his  specific  interpretation of  justice.  It  is  therefore
indispensable at this point to turn to a passage from Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence”,
and to Derrida’s interpretation thereof in “Force of Law” (1994).37
26 In his essay, Benjamin focuses on the relation between right and violence, and introduces
the  decisive  distinction  between  ‘constituent  violence’  (rechtsetzende  Gewalt)  and
‘constituted violence’ (rechterhaltende Gewalt). This is not the place to comment in detail
on the complex structure of his argument; nevertheless, it is worth noting a few points
about this distinction, accentuating especially the constituent act. Benjamin analyses the
right-inherited  violence  and  elucidates  that  every  act  of  law,  be  it  constituent  or
constituted,  is  an  act  of  violence.  Following  a  short  genealogy  of  the  traditional
understanding  of  law,  and  taking  into  account  the  opposition  between  natural  and
positive law, he postulates another form of violence in order to overcome the circularity
of law and violence: ‘pure violence’ (reine Gewalt) on the one hand, and the proletarian
general strike on the other. In this framework, the only possibility for a transformation of
the existing order lies in the identification and the affirmation of a quasi-apocalyptic
notion of completing and finalising judgement.
27 According  to  Derrida,  the  distinction  between  constituent  and  constituted  violence
cannot be maintained. On the contrary: the inseparability between both forms of violence
must  be  underlined in order  to  extract  the possibility  of  political  –  and historical  –
transformation,  without  endangering basic  normative rights.  In  line  with Benjamin’s
argument, Derrida further explains that the differentiation between performative and
conservative acts is rendered obsolete. That is to say, it is necessary to enter into the de
facto  existing  terminology  in  order  to  initiate  right,  yet  –  at  the  same  time  –  the
conservation  of  law  permanently  confirms  its  validity.  The  conservative  and  the
performative act are intrinsically interrelated according to their mutual dispute along
indistinct  borders.  Their  reciprocal  interdependence  is  characterised  by the  aporetic
movement between two antagonistic poles, and it brings about a surplus which originates
in the initiating side: the founding act always tends towards a domination of existing
laws,  thus  endangering  their  authority.  Derrida  closely  follows  Benjamin  in  his
reconstruction of this dynamic up to its founding origin. However, the violent original
institution of the law happens within the law and without the law at the same time. This
is  why,  according  to  Derrida,  the  original  foundation  of  law  cannot  be  sufficiently
explained within a terminology of violence.38
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28 The specificity of this founding violence stems from the problem of temporality. In the
context of his elaborations on ‘pure violence’, Benjamin already remarks that it can only
be  ascertained  retrospectively  if  ‘pure  violence’  has  in  fact  manifested  itself.  If  this
manifestation has actually lead to a transformation of the social, political, and historical
order, then any decision whatsoever can only be taken from the perspective of a future
anterior. Whereas Benjamin relates this insight to the possible realisation of an ulterior
violence, Derrida emphasises that it affects the foundation of law as such. For the time-
structure of the future anterior can certainly hint at the founding act, but it cannot give
any information about events which take place presently, since it is at the innermost core
of  this  initiating  moment  that  it  cannot  be  articulated  completely  in  traditional
categories of time or language. In these particular founding moments, there is no logical
succession of cause and effect. Due to their indefinability and their inscrutability, the
potentially constituent acts also contain a potential danger that makes one worry about
the  manner  in  which  they  manifest  themselves  here  and  now.  Simultaneously,  the
performative character of the founding act indicates that what is unleashed here can be
regarded  as  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  each  and  every political  act.  In  its
potentiality, the foundation of this initiating moment, which lets all action begin, remains
hidden in the moment of its initiation: it remains mystical. Any certainty and any secure
knowledge as to whether this founding moment is a transforming act or not, can only be
gained  retrospectively.  The  original  foundation  remains  necessarily  undecidable,  as
Derrida writes:
[h]ere, a silence is walled up in the violent structure of the founding act. Walled up
and walled in because silence is not exterior to language. It is in that sense that I
would be tempted to interpret [...]  what Montaigne and Pascal  call  the mystical
foundation of authority.39
29 Silence reigns in the founding moment – there is no hope of ever finding reasons for the
originary, initiative act. No theory will ever be able to give answers about the origin of
authority,  because  the  origin  of  authority  founds  itself.  This  is  why  it  is  not  even
acceptable to talk about an ‘origin’. Instead,
[i]ts very moment of foundation or institution [...] would consist of a coup de force, of
a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just
nor  unjust  and  that  no  justice  and  no  previous  law  with  its  founding  anterior
moment  could  guarantee  or  contradict  or  invalidate.  No  justificatory  discourse
could or should insure the role of metalanguage in relation to the performativity or
institutive language or to its dominant interpretation.40
30 The categories of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ are therefore not applicable, because this law-positing
moment is  beyond transcendence and immanence.  Neither the reference to a higher
reason nor the verification of inherent criteria is capable of affecting this event. In the
moment of initiation, there is no movement, and yet everything is decided exactly here. It
is the moment of standstill, in which the performative act exceeds its very own moment
of silence and demands a decision. Benjamin’s ‘dialectics at a standstill’ therefore does
not  mean  the  suspension  of  dialectical  movement,  but  its  unfolding  expansion,  its
potentialisation, beyond the chronological succession of past – present – future.41 This
view is  not  comprehensible  within  the  framework  of  a  classical  conception of  time,
because in fact nothing happens at this point. The initiating acts actually happen in between
time(s), and since they are happening perpetually in these instants, they are elusive and
deny any searching for reasons. From the perspective of the In-Between, the realm beyond
transcendence and immanence does not have a peripheral character, but is inherent in
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itself. The transcendence of law only comes to pass insofar as it is installed as a coming
law.  In  other  words:  it  is  only  in its  future  institution  that  the  law  attains  its
transcendental status and returns to the level of action. Thus, the source of the law is
always both immanent and transcendent. At the same time, it can never be completely
traced  back  to  these  antagonistic  poles.  Hence,  the  interpretability  of  future  events
depends on the particular effective structure of law in the same measure as the outcome
of the initiation remains necessarily open.
31 For  Benjamin,  it  is  the  historian's  responsibility  to  ultimately  interpret  the
manifestations  of  divine  violence  as  such,  whereas  Derrida  states  that  even  an
interpretation in retrospect cannot take place outside of the axioms of the existing order.
The interpretation of law thus always happens within the limits of the already existing
frameworks of  interpretation.  The future interpretation of  constituent  acts  therefore
must  refer  to  the  semantic  structure  of  what-has-been in  order  to  attain  both
comprehensibility and comprehension of the outcome of the initiation. The necessity to
actualise the already-existing models of interpretation results, not least, in fulfilling the
requirement  to  establish  and  legitimate  the  instituting  violence.  The  surplus,  which
originates from the relation between the possibilities of interpretation already inherent
in  the  system’s  matrix  and  the  contingency  of  potentially  realisable  acts  are  the
conditions for the realisation of constituent events per se. Their creative power results
from this synchronising mutual dynamic of convention and actualisation, conservation
and destruction.  The event of  the constituent  action obtains its  facticity only in the
moment of its temporalisation, which brings it inevitably and immediately into a relation
with  the  present  and  effective  ethical  order.  This  implies  that  this  order  has  to  be
permanently cited.
32 This  is  why Benjamin’s  dichotomic  distinctions  (constituent/constituted,  proletarian/
political) become problematic for Derrida, as they ultimately do not come together, but
are  completely  negated  by  an  external  violence.  The  negation  that  is  meant  here,
however, has the paradoxical character of being both a founding and a preserving power.
It  is not similar to complete destruction, however messianic this completion may be;
rather, it dislocates the two poles, which are not definitely distinguishable, taking into
consideration the differentiating moment. Initiation and conservation of law are not self-
contained antipodes in the historical process of a purposively rational eschatology – even
Benjamin  admits  the  impossibility  of  a  total  closure  of  these  moments  –  but  their
characteristic  feature is  precisely  the impossibility  to  abolish the symbiotic,  aporetic
movement of their immanent antagonisms, as Derrida writes:
But this figure is also a contamination. It effaces or blurs the distinction, pure and
simple, between foundation and conservation. It inscribes iterability in originarity,
in unicity and singularity [...].42
33 The  singularity,  in  which  the  iterability  (citability  and  repeatability)  is  originally
engraved, is the law, and – along with it – the idea of justice. Whereas Benjamin demands
to finally arrest the possibility of a circular movement of law-positing and law-conserving
violence through the instauration of a pure divine violence, Derrida, on the contrary,
insists on the necessity to bear this aporia.43 For him, the surplus is a direct consequence
of the undecidability of every political and legal decision, as it gives an outlook on the
necessary claim of an infinite justice, and therefore points to the urgency to do justice to
the singularity and the alterity of the Other.
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34 The surplus opens up a third perspective, in which the non-positionality of the boundaries
can possibly be established against the background of normative claims.  If,  following
Benjamin’s  argument,  historical  events  are always regarded as  something completely
new, then the task of the historian is to identify and to scatter any thought of progress
and any current of thought assuming that historical events could be repeated. For the
repetition does not take place on the level of the events themselves but rather on the
level of citation and iteration. Within this understanding of historical dynamics, ‘writing
history’  means focussing on the singular  events  and assembling them into a  greater
scope.
35 Accordingly,  Benjamin’s  term  for  historiography  is  montage.  In  order  to  arrange  a
montage, the historian is supposed to “cite history”.44 The application of this ‘method’ of
citation in materialist historiography means that the objects have to be extracted from
their respective contexts. As Benjamin writes: “[i]t belongs to the concept of citation,
however, that the historical object in each case is torn from its context.”45 In an earlier
passage from this text, he expresses this thought even more pointedly, writing that “the
object of history is to be blasted out of the continuum of historical succession”46 and,
moreover, that materialist historiography not only takes hold of historical objects, but
rather “springs them loose from the order of succession”.47
36 From a retrospective standpoint, then, the historian attains knowledge about the objects
in order to detach them from the continuum of history. Everything now depends on the
right interpretation of the relation between the past and the future. The correct exegesis
of  history  shifts  from a  supposedly  objective  sequence  of  events  to  the  level  of  the
subject’s perception, or more precisely: to the subject’s relation to a concrete context.
Benjamin’s ‘ideal historian’ arranges a montage of history – he cites historical events,
which are essentially characterised by their “monadological structure”.48 The historian is
the one who passes on tradition as discontinuity and he passes it on through destruction.
49 The historian is the herald who follows the disruptive traces of history, who interprets
them and puts them into writing. In line with this argument, the quote presented at the
outset of this article – ‘In the fields with which we are concerned, knowledge comes only
in lightning flashes’ – concludes with the following sentence: “The text is the long roll of
thunder that follows.”50
37 If it is true that ‘subjects’ are not subjected to the fate of the course of history, and if it is
true that they are obliged to cross seemingly established and unchangeable boundaries,
then historical  knowledge is  equivalent  to  the opening towards  a  world of  potential
possibilities  of  action.51 It  is  in  this  opening,  in  its  destruction  of  pre-established
successions,  that  Benjamin locates  the  premise  for  the  realisation of  happiness.  The
historian is the herald of this happiness.
 
III. Crystal Magic
"These are signs of the times, not to be hidden by
purple mantles or black cassocks. They do not
signify that tomorrow a miracle will happen. They
show that, within the ruling classes themselves, a
foreboding is dawning, that the present society is
no solid crystal, but an organism capable of
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change, and is constantly changing."
Karl Marx, Capital
38 If,  as  we  have  seen  above,  historical  knowledge  provides  the  basis  for  transcending
established boundaries towards the realm of potential action, then this gives rise to the
following questions: how exactly could this action be understood? Why is an initiating act
necessary? And what is the role and function of the surplus? These questions rest on the
assumption that a further distinction is the immanent basis of the moment of initiation:
for not only does it contain the act itself; it also contains the moment before an action is
actually performed. In this sense, the surplus provides a possible performative act as the
possibility of a transforming political action par excellence. 
39 This dialectic between pure possibility and manifestation is the point at which the force
originates and, as such, it  is the condition of possibility of political  action because it
enforces and empowers decisions. It must immerse itself in existing terminologies and
yet it destroys them at the same time. This is why political action, as well as historical
action, is primarily to be understood as de-constitutive action, which is always already
connected to the singular event – the ‘Now’.
40 Departing from this dialectic between pure possibility and its manifestation, historico-
political action is relieved from any chronological timescale, and hence directed inwards
towards  the  core  of  its  dialectical  or  aporetic  movement.  In  his  aforementioned
discussion of Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence”, Derrida characterises precisely this core
of the mythical founding act as necessarily undecidable, which is to say, as a moment of
silence.  Furthermore,  as  he  reminds  us,  this  fundamental  silence  “is  not  exterior  to
language”.52 This  statement  points  us  to  the  connection  between  language  and  the
historico-political sphere, and, indeed, between Benjamin’s and Derrida’s writings.
41 In his illuminating early letter to Martin Buber, written in July 1916, Benjamin explicitly
refers to the relation between politics and language.53 In this letter, he refuses Buber’s
invitation to publish an article in his newly founded journal Der Jude. Benjamin justifies
his refusal by arguing that, to him, the journal’s content is unbearable as it conforms to
the  general  tone  of  political  writing  in  Germany  at  that  time:  a  terminological
performance of  war propaganda.54 Behind the idea of  “politically effectual  writing” (
politisch wirksamem Schrifttum), Benjamin argues, lies a profound misunderstanding about
how writing, or theory in general, may affect political action: language here is regarded
as if it could deliver the “motives behind action”.55 Hence, as Benjamin writes, language
and  writing  are  “degraded”  to  a  status  of  being  only  “mere  means”  to  calculable
instrumental  actions.56 The relation between “word[s]  and deed[s]”  can thus  only  be
understood  as  a  chain  of  mediations,  as  “a  mechanism  for  the  actualisation  [
Verwirklichung]  of the true absolute”.57 Directing political  writing towards an absolute
truth is equivalent to a “pitiful, weak action […] whose origin does not reside within itself,
but  in  some  kind  of  sayable  and  expressible  motives.”58 In  contrast  to  this  view of
language  as  a  mere  means-end-relation,  Benjamin  unfolds  his  concept  of  “objective
writing”,  in  which  language  is  not  understood  as  “mediation  of  contents”  but  as
immediateness.59 The relation between language and politics can therefore be understood
as a relation between the unsayable and political action, in which the magical nature of
language is  preserved and destroyed at  the same time.  “I  can understand writing as
such”, Benjamin elucidates,
as poetic, prophetic, objective in terms of its effect, but in any case only as magical,
that is as un-mediated. […] And if I disregard other effective forms here – aside from
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poetry and prophecy – it repeatedly seems to me that the crystal-pure elimination
of the unsayable in language is the most obvious form given to us to be effective
within language and, to that extent, through it. This elimination of the unsayable
seems  to  me  to  coincide  precisely  with  what  is  actually  the  objective  and
dispassionate manner of writing […].60
42 Only a writing which includes the realm of the unsayable fulfils the criteria of being
‘politically effectual writing’, and can be equated with politically effectual action. But this
inclusion not only contains the preservation of the unsayable, it is also its instantaneous
negation.  Thus,  the  magic  of  language61 as  such  is  a  necessary  condition  for  what
Benjamin calls ‘objective writing’: 
My concept of objective and, at the same time, highly political style and writing is
this: to direct towards [hinzuführen] what was denied to the word; only where this
sphere of speechlessness reveals itself  in unutterably pure power can the magic
spark leap between the word and the motivating deed, where the unity of these two
equally  real  entities  resides.  Only  the  intensive  direction  [intensive  Richtung]  of
words into the core of intrinsic silence is truly effective.62
43 Therefore, the ‘crystal-pure elimination’ of ‘what is denied to the word’ is neither only an
“expansive tendency”63 – as popular political writing is for Benjamin – nor is it restrictive,
in the sense of a mere reduction. Rather, it indicates a direction towards the centre of the
dialectic between suspension and preservation. That is to say, it is an inverse effectuality.
This  inverse directedness  into the inner core of  the dialectical  movement cannot  be
regarded as a geometrical line, but as an extension in the point, as an extension without
extension – in other words, as an in-tension in the sense of an inner tension. The German
expression hinführen (zu/auf) –  which signifies  a  directing or  leading  towards –  then is
closely linked to the intensity of the introversive direction towards the ineffable. Its in-
tense directedness not only rests on an approximation of ‘what was denied to the word’
but,  at  the same time,  adds a supplement to the momentary point.  Hence,  within the
dialectical  movement,  in  which  language  and  the  political  are  entangled,  something
additional  is  exposed.  This  is  the reason why Benjamin characterizes the moment of
silence as a moment of tension or, as he writes, as a manifestation of ‘pure power’ (reiner
Macht).64 In language,  this  supplementary power enforces an unveiling of  its  magical
origin – that is its infinite potential – whereas in politics the role and function of this
additive moment (or let us say the surplus) – can be regarded as an empowering, de-
constitutive act, that is to say, as an initiating, but indeterminable and therefore mystical
force.  With regard to  the realm of  the unspeakable,  one can thus  draw a  structural
similarity between language and politics. Silence, the unspeakable, and that which ‘was
denied to the word’ are, in this respect, the sites where the mystical foundation of politics
(and law) and the magical origin of language coincide. And although it is undeniable that
the notions of the magical and the mystical have varying connotations, both orbit the
border between the worldly/expressible and the unsayable.65
44 As a result a tension arises – a tension which potentially comes to be and is subjected to
negation only in the singular moment of the Now. Therefore, the ‘Now’, in its initiating,
preserving  and  destructive  character,  is  fraught  with  a  tension  in  which  all  of  its
elements  –  time,  space,  dialectical  movement  –  form  an  in-tense constellation.  This
instantaneous  moment  can  be  regarded  as  the  aforementioned  extraction  of  power.
Rather than clinging to a historico-political notion – which includes philosophical as well
as theological concepts – the ‘telos of historical dynamis’ can be found in this ‘force field’
(Kraftfeld), as Benjamin writes in his “Theologico-Political Fragment” (c. 1921).66 Turning
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back to The Arcades Project, we can now say that “the tension between dialectical opposites
is greatest”67 in this ‘force field’.  And with Derrida,  we can add: the point where the
dialectical opposite is greatest is aporetic because none of the aforementioned inverse
and tense moments can ultimately suspend or arrest their own forceful movements.68
Therefore the ‘historical telos’ does not point towards an ultimate goal, aim or good, but
towards a realm of potentialities. The ‘historical telos’ is, therefore, infinite or – more
precisely – its directedness is an inverse infinity.
45 At this point, we can see that a structural similarity obtains, not only between the inverse
infinity of  the historico-political  and language,  but  also between the former and the
ethical realm. In his book Aporias (1993), Jacques Derrida elucidates the necessity of the
infinite  continuation  of  polar  movements.  Rather  than  “giving  in  to  any  dialectical
[solution]”69 – even a suspension of the historical succession – he clearly indicates that we
should adhere to aporias. “There”, he states in reference to some of his writings, 
at a precise moment […] I used the term “aporia” for a single duty that recurrently
duplicates  itself  interminably,  fissures  itself,  and  contradicts  itself  without
remaining the same […].  I  suggested that a sort of nonpassive endurance of the
aporia was the condition of responsibility and of decision.70
46 To  experience  Benjamin’s  historical  momentum  could,  within  this  spectrum,  be
equivalent to an endurance of this aporia. Thus, it could lead to an approximation of
historical writing and political action – of the unsayable, the mystical and the political
sphere.  The  convergence  of  Benjamin’s  epistemological  and  historico-philosophical
considerations and Derrida’s ethical-political concept of enduring aporias could prepare a
path towards a new form of critique. As Benjamin writes in the thirteenth of his theses 
“On the Concept of History”, this new form of critique “must underlie any criticism of the
concept of progress itself”.71 Hence, it would have to start with a general transformation
of the traditional understanding of history and time:
The first stage of this undertaking will be to carry over the principle of montage
into history. That is, to assemble large-scale constructions out of the smallest and
most  precisely  cut  components.  Indeed,  to discover in the analysis  of  the small
individual moment the crystal of the total event.72
47 In view of the metaphor of the crystal, the ‘Now’ is the crystallised historical event. It is
crystallised time, and as such it represents the condition of the possibility of a politics of
openness. In E.T.A. Hoffmann’s novella The Golden Pot (1814), the crystal is a solidification
charm –  and charms,  magic,  and  the  unspeakable  are  “material  of  vital  importance
politically”73 for historical knowledge.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGAMBEN, Giorgio, Ausnahmezustand (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004).
AGAMBEN, Giorgio, La Potenza del pensiero: Saggi e conferenze (Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2005); 
Potentialities, ed./trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
AGAMBEN, Giorgio, “K.”, in: Nudità (Rome: Nottetempo, 2009).
A Crystal of Time
Anthropology & Materialism, Special Issue | I | 2017
14
ARENDT, Hannah, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysik, trans. Hermann Bonitz (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989).
BENJAMIN, Walter, Briefe, eds. Gershom Scholem & Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt/ Main:
Suhrkamp, 1966).
BENJAMIN, Walter, The Correspondence 1910-1940, eds. Gershom Scholem & Theodor W. Adorno,
trans. Manfred R. Jacobson & Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
BENJAMIN, Walter, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland, Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1999).
BENJAMIN, Walter, Gesammelte Schriften, eds. Hermann Schweppenhäuser & Rolf Tiedemann, 7
vols. (Frankfurt/ Main: Suhrkamp, 1972ff.).
BENJAMIN, Walter, Selected Writings, eds. Marcus Bollock & Michael W. Jennings, 4 vols.
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1996ff.).
BUCK-MORSS, Susan, Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, MA/
London: MIT Press, 1989).
CORNELL, Drucilla, ROSENFELD, Michael & CARLSON, David (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility
of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992).
DERRIDA, Jacques, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1978).
DERRIDA, Jacques, “Préjugés – devant la loi”, in: La faculté de juger (Paris: Edition de Minuit, 1985).
DERRIDA, Jacques, “Force of Law. The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, in: Deconstruction and
the Possibility of Justice, eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld et al. (New York: Routledge, 1992).
DERRIDA, Jacques, Aporias. Dying – Awaiting (One Another at) the ‘Limits of Truth’, trans. Thomas
Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
DERRIDA, Jacques, Limited Inc., trans. Werner Rappl & Dagmar Travner (Wien: Passagen Verlag,
2001).
DERRIDA, Jacques, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore/London: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2009).
FENVES, Peter, The Messianic Reduction: Walter Benjamin and the Shape of Time (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2010).
FERRIS, David S., (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
FRITSCH, Matthias, “Deconstructive Aporias: Quasi-Transcendental and Normative”, in: 
Continental Philosophy Review, No. 44:4 (2011).
GÖLZ, Sabine, “Geistesgegenwart als Lichtung im Ähnlichen. Benjamins ‘Gegenwart’ – ‘Heute’ bei
Bachmann”, in: Re-Acting to Ingeborg Bachmann: New Essays and Performances, eds. Caitríona Leahy
& Bernadette Cronin (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006).
GRAMSCI, Antonio, Gefängnishefte (Hamburg: Argument, 1991).
HAVERKAMP, Anselm, Gewalt und Gerechtigkeit: Derrida-Benjamin (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
1994).
HAMACHER, Werner, “The Word Wolke – If It Is One”, in: Benjamin’s Grounds: New Readings of
Walter Benjamin, ed. Rainer Nägele (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988).
A Crystal of Time
Anthropology & Materialism, Special Issue | I | 2017
15
HAMACHER, Werner, “Afformative, Strike: Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’”, in: Walter
Benjamin’s Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, eds. Andrew Benjamin & Peter Osborne (London/
New York: Routledge, 1994).
HAMACHER, Werner, “‘Now’: Walter Benjamin on Historical Time”, in: Walter Benjamin and History
, ed. Andrew Benjamin (London/New York: Routledge, 2005).
HEIDEGGER, Martin, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1996).
HOFFMANN, E.T.A., The Golden Pot. A Modern Fairytale, trans./ed. Ritchie Robertson (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992).
HUSSERL, Edmund, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy, trans. D. Carr
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
JAUß, Hans Robert, “Spur und Aura: Bemerkungen zu Walter Benjamins Passagenwerk”, in: Art
social und art industriel: Funktionen der Kunst im Zeitalter des Industrialismus, eds. Hans Robert Jauß,
H. Pfeiffer et al. (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1987).
KAFKA, Franz, Der Proceß (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag, 2009).
KASTEN, Madeleine, SNELLER, Rico et al. (eds.), Benjamin’s Figures (Nordhausen/Leiden: Traugott
Bautz, 2015).
KHATIB, Sami, “Walter Benjamin and the Subject of Historical Cognition”, in: Annals of Scholarship
, Special Issue “Walter Benjamin Unbound”, vol. 21.1 (2015), pp. 23-42.
LACLAU, Ernesto, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: Verso, 1977).
LAPPIN, Eleonore, Der Jude 1916-1928: Jüdische Moderne zwischen Partikularismus und Universalismus
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).
LINDNER, Burkhard, “Derrida. Benjamin. Holocaust”, in: global benjamin 3, eds. Klaus Garber &
Ludger Rehm (München: Fink Verlag, 1999).
LUKÁCS, Georg, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1970).
MARRATI, Paola, Genesis and Trace: Derrida reading Husserl and Heidegger (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2005).
MARX, Karl, Capital, Vol. 1, The Process of Production of Capital, Marx/ Engels Internet Archive
(marxist.org), 1995/1999.
MENKE, Christoph, “Können und Glauben: Die Möglichkeit der Gerechtigkeit”, in: Spiegelungen der
Gleichheit: Politische Philosophie nach Adorno und Derrida (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004).
MENNINGHAUS, Winfried, Walter Benjamins Theorie der Sprachmagie (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
1980).
NÄGELE, Rainer (ed.), Benjamin’s Grounds: New Readings of Walter Benjamin (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1988).
QUADFLIEG, Dirk, “Die Frage des Fremden: Derrida und das Paradox der absoluten
Gastfreundschaft”, in: Politische Philosophie und Dekonstruktion: Beiträge zur politischen Theorie im
Anschluss an Jacques Derrida, eds. Andreas Niederberger & Markus Wolf (Bielefeld: Transcript
Verlag, 2007).
RICHTER, Gerhard, “Acts of Self-Potraiture: Benjamin’s Confessional and Literary Writings”, in: 
The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin, ed. David S. Ferris (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), pp. 221-237.
A Crystal of Time
Anthropology & Materialism, Special Issue | I | 2017
16
SAHRAOUI, Nassima, “The Flâneur and Socio-Economic Critique”, in: Benjamin’s Figures, eds.
Madeleine Kasten, Rico Sneller et al. (Nordhausen/Leiden: Bautz Traugott, forthcoming).
SALZANI, Carlo, Constellation of Reading. Walter Benjamin in Figure of Actuality (Bern: Peter Lang
Verlag, 2009).
SCHOLEM, Gershom, “Der Name Gottes und die Sprachtheorie der Kabbala”, in: Judaica 3. Studien
zur jüdischen Mystik (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1973).
SHAKESPEARE, William, Complete Works, ed. W.J. Craig (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).
STEINER, Uwe, “Die Magie der Sprache”, in: Walter Benjamin (Stuttgart/Weimar: J.B. Metzler,
2004).
STEINER, Uwe, “Phänomenologie der Moderne”, in: Benjamin-Studien 1, eds. Daniel Weidner &
Sigrid Weigel (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2008).
WITTE, Bernd & PONZI, Mauro (eds.), Theologie und Politik: Walter Benjamin und ein Paradigma der
Moderne (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2005)
ENDNOTES
1. An earlier, shorter version of this article will be published in Spanish under the title “Cristales
de tiempo. Reflexiones (polítcas) sobreunahistoria del ahora”, trans. Nicolás Esteban Vargas, in:
Esperanza, pero no para nosotros. Capitalismo, técnica y estética en W. Benjamin, eds. Horst Nitschak &
Miguel Vatter (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, forthcoming). I  would like to thank Werner
Hamacher, Sami Khatib, Caroline Sauter, María del Rosario Acosta López, Martin Saar, Jan Sieber,
and Sebastian Truskolaski for their critical and fruitful comments on earlier drafts of this paper,
and, once again, Caroline Sauter for her patient and careful translation of parts of this text into
English.
2. Why it is legitimate to explicitly understand the concept of power as force is grounded on a
specific interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of dynamis. In this ontological reading, power
means a relational potentiality which lies in, and in between beings and things, and which has – if
actualised – an inherent possibility to initiate surrounding structures. (Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysik,
trans.  Hermann Bonitz [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,  1998],  IX 8,  1049b 4-5,  p.12-17) In his
groundbreaking essay collection on Aristotle’s dynamis, Giorgio Agamben has successfully related
this concept to the theories of Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin. (Cf. Agamben, La potenza
del pensiero. Saggi e conferenze [Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2005]). A first selection of Agamben’s essays
have  already  been  edited  and  translated  into  English  by  Daniel  Heller-Roazen  in  1999.  See:
Agamben,  Potentialities,  ed./trans.  Daniel  Heller-Roazen  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,
1999). 
3. Here, it must be briefly pointed out that the ways these ‘ethical reasons’ are to be understood
throughout Derrida’s work differ profoundly from a traditional understanding of ethics, and thus
depart from classical teleological or deontological approaches. Instead Derrida develops the idea
of  a  quasi-transcendental,  in  which  the  transcendental  not  only  announces  the  condition  of
possibility  for  the subject  of  cognition,  but  at  the same time also  refers  to  the condition of
impossibility. Hence, ethics are located at the border of the possible and the impossible, of the
conditional and unconditional. That is to say, they depart from a différance, as Derrida elucidates
in Limited Inc (1988). In his intense engagement with Levinas, he works out that the question of
ethics is inseparably bound to the question of alterity and thus to an openness towards the Other.
It points beyond the remit of the present article to further investigate this remark. Instead, I
refer  to  a  few  relevant  and  enlightening  texts,  such  as:  Jacques  Derrida,  Limited  Inc.,  trans.
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Werner Rappl & Dagmar Travner (Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2001); Jacques Derrida, “Violence and
Metaphysics”, in: Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1978).  An analysis  of  how ethics  and the  quasi-transcendental  are  correlated  is  provided by
Matthias Fritsch in his article “Deconstructive Aporias: Quasi-Transcendental and Normative”,
in:  Continental  Philosophy Review, No. 44:  4 (November 2011),  pp. 439-468.  To what extend this
openness to the Other is entangled to the gift (le don), and to the question of hospitality has been
worked out by Dirk Quadflieg in his article “Die Frage des Fremden. Derrida und das Paradox der
absoluten Gastfreundschaft”,  in:  Politische Philosophie  und Dekonstruktion.  Beiträge  zur  politischen
Theorie  im  Anschluss  an  Jacques  Derrida,  eds.  Andreas  Niederberger  &  Markus  Wolf  (Bielefeld:
Transcript Verlag, 2007), pp. 27-38.
4. Cf.  Benjamin,  Walter,  “Das  Kunstwerk  im Zeitalter  seiner  technischen  Reproduzierbarkeit
(Erste Fassung)”, in: Gesammelte Schriften I.2 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), pp. 431-469 ; “The
Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility”,  in:  Selected Writings 3,  1935-1938,
(Cambridge,  MA:  Belknap  Press  of  Harvard  University  Press,  2006),  pp.  101-133.  Henceforth
referred to as GS I.2. All English-language quotes are taken from the canonical English edition:
Walter  Benjamin,  Selected  Writings,  eds.  Howard  Eiland  &  Michael Jennings  (Cambridge,  MA:
Belknap  Press  of  Harvard  University  Press,  2006).  Although  artworks  have  always  been
“reproducible” (GS I.2, p. 436; SW III, p. 102), in his essay Benjamin astutely analyses the new
dimension  of  the  advancing  mechanisation  of  reproductive  means, and  the  concomitant
alteration of the status of particular works. Artworks are not only replaced by their likeness (
Abbild), but rather achieve their own status through processes of ritualisation, in which they are
admittedly detached from their respective ‘original’, but without retaining an ‘original’ kernel.
By implementing the new techniques of reproduction, Benjamin concludes, the authenticity and
originality of the artwork is irretrievably lost. The chock – being the primary characteristic of
modern  times  –  describes  the  advancing  acceleration  and  transformation  of  established
modalities of action and perception, which go hand in hand with Benjamin’s prognosis of the
“decay of the aura” (GS I.2, p. 440; SW III, p. 104). At this point, any further implication or critique
of Benjamin’s use of the concept of the aura, such as, for instance, Bertolt Brecht’s charge of
mysticism,  have to  be excluded for  evident  reasons.  (Cf.  Hans Robert  Jauß,  “Spur und Aura.
Bemerkungen zu Walter Benjamins Passagenwerk“, in: Art social und art industriel. Funktionen der
Kunst im Zeitalter des Industrialismus, eds. H. R. Jauß & H. Pfeiffer et al. [München: Wilhelm Fink
Verlag, 1987], pp. 19-38.)
5. GS I.2, p. 440; SW III, p. 104.
6. GS I.2, p. 438; SW III, p. 103.
7. Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1999), M 16 a, 4. Henceforth referred to as AP. It is no
coincidence that this formula is embedded into the paragraph on the flâneur. Here, the flâneur
and the  detective  are  literally  synchronised,  and behind the  flâneur’s  seemingly  true  sublime
abstention from the social environment, “in reality, hides the riveted attention of an observer
who will not let the unsuspected malefactor out of his sight.” With investigative skill the flâneur
perceives, uncovers, and deepens the traces of society and to this extent his ‘task’ is of socio-
critical relevance (Cf. AP, M 13 a, 2). Benjamin’s terminology in this paragraph, and his remarks
on ‘habitus’ and ‘social legitimation’, lead to the assumption that he might consider the flâneur
as being a proto-sociological observer. The specifically ‘flaneurous’ behaviour of the flâneur, his
interruption of the social environment, does not result in his ability to empathise with things. (On
the concept of empathy, see: AP, M 17a 2, 4, 5.) It is of primary interest for my purpose here that
the flâneur’s sublimity can be traced back to a rational perception of the social surroundings.
Nevertheless, at this point, it must be remarked that the flâneur is undoubtedly one of the most
ambivalent  figures  in  Benjamin’s  work.  See  for  instance Carlo  Salzani’s  thorough  study
Constellations of Reading. Walter Benjamin in Figures of Actuality (Bern: Peter Lang Verlag, 2009), pp.
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37-80.  In  her  groundbreaking  Dialectics  of  Seeing.  Walter  Benjamin  and  the  Arcades  Project
(Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press, 1989), Susan Buck-Morss also provides a short but precise
portrait of this figure, cf. 304-307. See also: Nassima Sahraoui, “The Flâneur and Socio-Economic
Critique”, in: Benjamin’s Figures, eds. Madeleine Kasten, Rico Sneller et al. (Nordhausen/ Leiden:
Bautz Traugott, 2015), forthcoming.
8. Benjamin makes use of the concept of constellation throughout his work; for instance in One-
Way Street (1928), Berlin Childhood Around 1900 (c. 1933-1938), “On the Concept of History” (1940),
the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” to his Origin of the German Mourning-Play (1928). In one of the
fragments of The Arcades Project he writes: “It is not that what is past casts its light on what is
present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been
comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation.” (AP, N 2a, 3). 
9. The  concept  of  destruction  in  Benjamin  hints  at  a  minor  theoretical  similarity  between
Benjamin  and  Heidegger.  Even  if  Benjamin  himself  sharply  criticised  Heidegger,  it  is  worth
considering how both thinkers deal with the philosophical tradition. The point at which they
briefly touch theoretically is in their respective focus on momentum. In Being and Time (1927)
Heidegger writes: “But this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking
off  the  ontological  tradition.  [...]  On  its  negative  side,  this  destruction  does  not  relate  itself
toward the past; its criticism is aimed at ‘today’ and at the prevalent way of treating the history
of ontology. But to bury the past in nullity (Nichtigkeit) is not the purpose of this destruction; its
aim is  positive;  its  negative  function remains  unexpressed and indirect.”  (Martin  Heidegger,
Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 44].)
Of course Benjamin and Heidegger offer very different ways in which this ‘criticism of today’ can
be pursued. For instance, Heidegger states that these times are defined by worldly abandonment
(a thought that is pursued by Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition, 1958) and by structural,
historical regression (a thought which, despite fundamental differences, also appears in Husserl’s
Crisis of the European Sciences, 1936). In contrast, Benjamin diagnoses not only a spiritual crisis or a
Weltvergessenheit, but also the negative effects of capitalism. So while the Heideggerian Dasein can
only be salvaged from oblivion through embedding itself in the (existentially actualised) ‘man’ –
a notion which places him in ideological proximity to right-wing politics – Benjamin proposes
the  arrest  of  historical  processes  instead  of  their  mere  ontologisation.  The  sense  in  which
Benjamin’s ‘increased destruction’ might also be suspected of being ‘unethical’  will  be shown
below, with Derrida.
10. There is an evident proximity to Derrida’s exegesis of the trace. In Of Grammatology (1967) he
writes on the relation between the trace and the real: “The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense
in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The
trace is  the difference which opens appearance [l’apparaître]  and signification.” (Jacques Derrida, Of
Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak [Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2009], p. 65.) An excellent analysis of the philosophical overlappings on the concept of
trace between Derrida, Husserl and Heidegger can be found in Paola Marrati’s Genesis and Trace:
Derrida reading Husserl and Heidegger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). For a thorough
reading  of  the  relation  between  Benjamin  and  Husserl,  see  Uwe  Steiner’s  article
“Phänomenologie  der  Moderne”,  in:  Benjamin-Studien  1,  eds.  Daniel  Weidner  &  Sigrid  Weigel
(München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2008), pp. 107-126.
11. AP, N1,1.
12. The manifold problems around Benjamin’s very specific and even idiosyncratic reading of
historical  materialism,  his  ‘alliance’  with Bert  Brecht,  and his  differences with the Frankfurt
School could be the object of an extensive and detailed study in itself. This study can, sadly, not
be provided here.
13. One could continue this thought by stating that Benjamin does not conform to a more or less
classical critique of ideology in general, if ideology is merely understood as a phenomenon of
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consciousness, where subjects find themselves in a context of delusion out of which they can only
escape through insight into a particular truth. (Cf. Georg Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein
,  [Berlin:  Luchterhand  1970].)  Another  example  of  a  Marxist  approach  that  is  not  primarily
concerned with revealing a ‘transcendental’ truth can be found in the work of Antonio Gramsci,
who attempts to deconstruct the discourse on ideology itself. Gramsci’s contemporary followers
include  Slavoj  Žižek,  Judith Butler,  and  Ernesto  Laclau (Cf.  Antonio  Gramsci,  Gefängnishefte,
[Hamburg: Argument, 1991], and, amongst others, Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist
Theory, [London: Verso, 1977].)
14. AP, N 1,1.
15. SW 4, p. 394. 
16. Benjamin’s notion of the subject consists of many layers and can be approached in multiple
ways.  A thorough reading of  how these multiple layers of  Benjamin’s  concept of  the subject
might be understood, however, exceeds the confines of the present article.
17. Gerhard Richter, “Acts of Self-Portraiture: Benjamin’s Confessional and Literary Writings”, in:
The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin, ed. David S. Ferris (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), p. 224.
18. In his essay, Richter – with reference to Benjamin’s autobiographical writings – shows how
Benjamin upholds the concept of the subject, rather than neglecting it as a whole. (See Richter,
“Acts of  Self-Portraiture”,  pp.  224ff)  Werner Hamacher refers to Benjamin’s  autobiographical
writings, too, as Richter points out (cf. ibid, p. 225). In his illuminating essay ‘The Word Wolke–If
It Is One’, Hamacher confirms that “it cannot be doubted that Benjamin’s memoires represent
the impetus as  well  as  the explication,  extrapolation and fulfilment of  the program that  his
theoretical  writings  formulate.”  (Werner  Hamacher,  “The  Word  Wolke  –  If  It  Is  One”,  in:
Benjamin’s  Grounds.  New  Readings  of  Walter  Benjamin,  ed. Rainer  Nägele  (Detroit:  Wayne  State
University Press, 1988), p. 152.
19. SW 4, p. 394.
20. The whole quote reads as follows: “Innerhalb großer geschichtlicher Zeiträume verändert
sich mit der gesamten Daseinsweise der historischen Kollektiva auch ihre Wahrnehmung. Die Art
und Weise,  in der die menschliche Wahrnehmung sich organisiert  – das Medium, in dem sie
erfolgt  –  ist  nicht  nur  natürlich  sondern  auch  geschichtlich  bedingt.”  (GS  I.2,  p.  439.)  [My
translation.]
21. AP, N 2,6.
22. GS I.3, p. 1243 (Ms. 474.) [My translation.] The original quotation reads as follows: “Dieses
Subjekt ist beileibe kein Transzendentalsubjekt sondern die kämpfende unterdrückte Klasse in
ihrer exponiertesten Situation. Historische Erkenntnis gibt es allein für sie und für sie einzig im
historischen  Augenblick.”  In  his  article  “Walter  Benjamin  and  the  Subject  of  Historical
Cognition”,  Sami  Khatib  provides  a  first  analysis  of  how  Benjamin’s  subject  of  historical
knowledge  is  intertwined  with  and dissociated  from  Kant’s  transcendental  subject,  whose
principal characteristic lies precisely in its “non-historicity”. (Cf. Sami Khatib, “Walter Benjamin
and the Subject of Historical Cognition”, in: Annals of Scholarship, Special Issue “Walter Benjamin
Unbound”, vol. 21.1 [2015], p. 23.) Khatib rightly assumes that Benjamin’s notion of the subject
can thus only been understood “against the backdrop of Marx and Kant.” (Ibid.)
23. GS I.3, p. 1245. [My translation.]
24. AP, N 1,1.
25. AP, N 7a,1. 
26. AP, N 9,5. 
27. GS I.2, p. 701; SW 4, p. 395.
28. AP, N 9,7. 
29. AP, N 3,1. 
30. AP, N 3,2. 
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31. See  AP, N  3,1  and N 8a,4.  In  contrast  to  Hannah Arendt’s  reading,  Benjamin  repeatedly
polemicizes against Heidegger’s approach to a philosophy of history – not only in The Arcades
Project. (Hannah Arendt, “Walter Benjamin (Essay 1968/71)”, in: Arendt und Benjamin. Texte, Briefe,
Dokumente, eds. Detlev Schöttker & Erdmut Wizisla (Frankfurt/Main: 2006), pp. 45-98. 
32. “For the historical index of the images not only says that they belong to a particular time; it
says, above all, that they attain to legibility only at a particular time.” (AP, N 3,1.)
33. AP, N 2a,3. Werner Hamacher and Sabine Gölz provided two outstanding interpretations of
Benjamin’s concept of the ‘Now’, albeit with different emphases. Hamacher focuses on the aspect
of  non-messianic  messianicity,  whereas  Sabine  Gölz  concentrates  on  the  inter-legibility  of
Benjamin’s  ‘Now’  and  Ingeborg  Bachmann’s  concept  of  ‘Heute’.  (Werner  Hamacher,  “’Now’:
Walter Benjamin on Historical  Time”,  trans.  N.  Rosenthal,  in:  Walter  Benjamin and History,  ed.
Andrew  Benjamin  [London/New  York:  Routledge,  2005],  pp.  38-68;  Sabine  Gölz,
“Geistesgegenwart als Lichtung im Ähnlichen: Benjamins ‘Gegenwart’ – ‘Heute’ bei Bachmann”,
in: Re-Acting to Ingeborg Bachmann: New Essays and Performances, eds. Caitríona Leahy & Bernadette
Cronin [Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006], pp. 97-109.)
34. AP, N 10a,3. 
35. AP, N 3,1. 
36. See also AP, N 3,1: “In it [the Now], truth is charged to the bursting point with time. (This
point of explosion, and nothing else, is the death of the intentio, which thus coincides with the
birth of authentic historical time, the time of truth.”
37. At  this  point  it  is  impossible  to  highlight  all  aspects  of  the discussion that  followed the
publication of Derrida’s book. Instead, I would like to point to exemplary contributions, such as
the volumes Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld,
David Carlson (New York:  Routledge,  1992);  and Gewalt  und Gerechtigkeit.  Derrida-Benjamin,  ed.
Anselm  Haverkamp  (Frankfurt/  Main:  Suhrkamp,  1994).  See  especially  Christoph  Menke,
“Können und Glauben. Die Möglichkeit der Gerechtigkeit”, in: Spiegelungen der Gleichheit: Politische
Philosophie nach Adorno und Derrida (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004); see also Burkhard Lindner,
“Derrida.  Benjamin.  Holocaust”,  in:  global  benjamin  3,  eds.  Klaus  Garber  &  Ludger  Rehm
(München: Fink Verlag, 1999). A critique on Derrida’s reading of Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’
is formulated by Giorgio Agamben in his book on the state of exception. See Giorgio Agamben,
Ausnahmezustand (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004). 
38. Cf. Derrida, Jacques, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, in: Deconstruction
and the Possibility of Justice, eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld et al. (New York: Routledge,
1992)  [henceforth referred to as FL]:  “This  moment of  suspense,  of  épokhe,  this  founding or
revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instant of non-law. […] But it is also the whole history
of  law.  This  moment  always  takes  place  and  never  takes  place  in  presence”  (FL,  p.  36).  What
characterises this Non-Law is that it is not bound to a specific time. Benjamin already writes in his
Kafka essay that it is a sort of “pre-world” (Vorwelt), in which the “law which is not practised
anymore” becomes the “narrow gate of justice”. (Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka”, in: Gesammelte
Schriften II.2 [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002], p. 437.) [My translation.]
The prefix pre- points to Derrida’s deconstruction of Kafka’s famous parable “Before the Law” in
Préjugés, where the protagonist ‘K.’ endures in front of the law’s gate to achieve the admission to
enter. As he does not initiate this action himself, he dies before the law. (Cf. Franz Kafka, “Vor
dem Gesetz”, in: Der Proceß [Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag, 2009], p. 226-227; Jacques Derrida,
“Préjugés – devant la loi”, in: La faculté de juger [Paris: Edition de Minuit, 1985]) For a brilliant and
quite hyperbolic interpretation of Kafka’s parable, see Giorgio Agamben, “K.”, in: Nudità (Rome:
Nottetempo, 2009).
39. FL, p. 14.
40. FL, pp. 13-14.
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41. As these moments do not contain a spatial extension, this ‘unfolding expansion’ must rather
be understood as an infinite ‘infolding expansion’  into their inner kernel,  that is  to say,  the
moments  approximate  the  realm  beyond  chronology  infinitesimally.  For  an  account  of  the
concepts  of  the  infinitesimal  and  infinite  approximation in  Benjamin  see:  Peter  Fenves,  The
Messianic Reduction:  Walter Benjamin and the Shape of  Time (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2010).
42. FL, p. 41.
43. In  his  enlightening  article  on  the  proletarian  general  strike  in  Benjamin’s  “Critique  of
Violence”, Werner Hamacher has explicitly argued against this reading of Benjamin. Moreover,
Hamacher focuses on the logic of de-positing acts. He points out that the dichotomic distinction
between law-positing and law-conserving violence is not ultimately suspended by pure violence,
but rather de-posited by pure means. (Cf. Werner Hamacher, “Afformative, Strike: Benjamin’s
‘Critique of Violence’”, in:  Walter  Benjamin’s  Philosophy:  Destruction and Experience,  eds.  Andrew
Benjamin & Peter Osborne [London/New York: Routledge, 1994], pp. 110-138.)
44. AP, N 11, 3.
45. AP, N 11, 3.
46. AP, N 10, 3. 
47. AP, N 10a, 1.
48. AP, N 10, 3.
49. In “The Destructive Character” (1931) Walter Benjamin writes: “[t]he destructive character is
young and cheerful. For destroying rejuvenates, because it clears away the traces of our own age
[…]”. (SW II, p. 541)
50. AP, N 1, 1. 
51. In his early essay “Fate and Character” (1919), Benjamin explains that the only way to escape
the fate of an order constituted by ‘unhappiness and guilt’ is a definite breaking apart of this very
order.  Only  in  this  way can happiness  be  obtained:  “Happiness  is,  rather,  what  releases  the
fortunate man from the embroilment of the Fates and from the net of his own fate.  Not for
nothing does Hölderlin call blissful gods ‘fateless’.” (SW I, p. 203.)
52. FL, p. 14.
53. The letter  can be found in:  The  Correspondence  of  Walter  Benjamin  1910-1940,  eds.  Gershom
Scholem & Theodor  W.  Adorno,  trans.  Manfred  R.  Jacobson  &  Evelyn  M.  Jacobson  (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press,  1994),  pp. 79-81. Henceforth referred to as Corresp. The German
edition was published as: Walter Benjamin: Briefe,  eds. Gershom Scholem & Theodor W. Adorno
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), pp. 125-128.
54. This charge can be traced back to Buber’s overture for the first volume of the journal, in
which he asserts that the Jewish youth movement has to have a certain dutiful enthusiasm for
the First World War. This ‘attestation’ caused a great amount of discussion amongst German-
Jewish thinkers at that time, especially those who were involved in pacifist and anarcho-socialist
movements,  such as  Gustav Landauer  and Gershom Scholem.  With regards  to  Buber’s  views,
Benjamin writes: “[a]fter this conversation [with Gershom Scholem], I was in a position to decide
whether I could possibly contribute to it [the journal Der Jude]. Because, in view of how intensely I
disagreed with so many of the contributions to the first volume – especially their position on the
European war – my awareness that, in reality, my attitude toward this journal was and could be
no other than my attitude toward all politically effectual writing [politisch wirksamem Schrifttum]
was obscured. The beginning of the war finally and decisively revealed this to me.” (Corresp., p.
79.) [Translation modified.] An interesting genealogy of Buber’s journal can be found in Eleonore
Lappin, Der Jude 1916-1928: Jüdische Moderne zwischen Partikularismus und Universalismus (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2000).
55. Corresp., p.79.
56. Ibid.
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57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid, pp. 79-80. [Translation modified.]
60. Ibid, p. 80. [Translation modified.]
61. For  the  concept of  magical  language  in  Benjamin,  see  Winfried  Menninghaus’  ground-
breaking  work Walter  Benjamins  Theorie  der  Sprachmagie  (Frankfurt/Main:  Suhrkamp, 1980).
Menninghaus highlights that Benjamin’s usage of the term magic in the context of language must
be read in close connection to his remarks on revelation, which is the “self-manifestation of
something unspeakable” (p. 22.) [All translations are my own]. Thereby, however, Benjamin does
not simply relapse into a form of language-mysticism, as e.g. the Romanticists do; instead, he
provides  the  “language-immanent  ground,  the  specific  possibility  to  transcend  a  linguistic
sensibility into mystical theology”, that means to “surmount” its religious connotations without
finally suspending,  but in “critically saving” them (p.  226).  Uwe Steiner provides a thorough
introduction to the magic of language in Benjamin’s writings. Cf. “Die Magie der Sprache”, in:
Walter Benjamin (Stuttgart/Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 2004), pp. 42-50.
62. Corresp., p. 80. [Translation modified.]
63. Ibid.
64. Although Benjamin uses the word revelation instead of manifestation, I would tend to exclude
this more or less theological reading at this point and, with it, all the implications for Political
Theology, which can be drawn out of it. A broad overview of this topic is given in the volume
Theologie  und Politik:  Walter  Benjamin und ein  Paradigma der  Moderne,  eds.  Bernd Witte & Ponzi
Mauro (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2005).
65. For the purpose of this article, the differences between magic and mysticism can be left aside,
since I focus only on the connecting axis of both notions. In his later work, too, Benjamin does
not  clearly  distinguish  between  both  terms  and  occasionally  uses  them  as  synonyms.  An
illustration of how magic and mysticism differ can be found in: Gershom Scholem, “Der Name
Gottes und die Sprachtheorie der Kabbala”, in: Judaica 3. Studien zur jüdischen Mystik (Frankfurt/
Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 26-31.
66. GS II.2, p. 203.
67. AP, N 10a,3. 
68. I  am grateful  to  Miguel  Vatter  for  having pointed out  the  importance  of  deepening the
question of how it is possible at all to think Benjamin’s dialectic together with Derrida’s aporias.
This very important aspect cannot, however, be fully elaborated in this paper. 
69. Jacques Derrida, Aporias: Dying – Awaiting (One Another at) the “Limits of Truth”, trans. Thomas
Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 16. Henceforth referred to as Aporias.
70. Aporias, p. 16.
71. GS I.2, p. 701; SW 4, p. 395.
72. AP, N 2,6.
73. AP, N 1,11. It is remarkable that in 1814, at the time of the publication of his novella The
Golden Pot, E.T.A. Hoffmann already criticised the naïveté of the bourgeoisie. Self-evidently his
point of departure lies in the Romantic tradition, unlike Marx, who wrote the preface to Capital,
quoted above, in 1867. But whereas Marx still  accentuates a linear time model and historical
succession, at least in Hoffmann’s fairy-tales, the world consists of various realities with differing
time structures. For example, within the crystal, time is almost solidified, whereas on the outside
it ‘fleets’. (Cf. E.T.A. Hoffmann, The Golden Pot: A Modern Fairytale [New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992]; see also: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, The Process of Production of Capital, in: Marx/Engels
Internet Archive (marxists.org), 1995, 1999.
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ABSTRACTS
The following  article  deconstructs  certain  figures  of  Benjamin’s  thoughts  on  history  and on
epistemology – such as image, trace, crystal, standstill, the ‘Now’, and the ‘subject of historical
knowledge’ – and relates them to the political dimension of his “Critique of Violence”, and to his
remarks  on  the  linguistic  structure  of  political  writing.  Thereby  it  centres  on  the  following
questions: in what way could Benjamin’s characterisation of the singular moment, as well as his
analysis  of  temporality  provide  insights  into  historical  dynamics?  Furthermore,  it  aims  at
investigating if and to what extent historico-political action is related to a certain understanding
of time and power: can such action be seen as a crystallised emanation of the ‘Now’, of Jetztzeit? 
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